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Liquidity, according to Keynes, offers a classic example of the fallacy of composition: what 
is true for a part is not necessarily true for the whole. The ability to reverse positions and get 
out quickly vanishes when everyone tries to do it at once. – Merton Miller (1991). 
 
1. Introduction 
There has been considerable attention paid in the recent literature to the question of how 
ownership structure, and in particular ownership by large investors, affects market liquidity, 
corporate governance and the value of the firm. One strand of this literature has focused on the 
tradeoff between the value of monitoring by a concentration of large investors and the cost of 
illiquidity of a firm’s shares. Bhide (1993) argues that policies aimed at increasing the liquidity of a 
firm’s shares by promoting diffused ownership reduce the incentives for large investors to monitor.  
This is because of free-riding by small investors, and because higher liquidity reduces the cost to 
large investors of “voting with their feet.” In contrast, Maug (1998) argues that a liquid market 
makes it easier and cheaper for investors to acquire and hold large concentrations of a security, and 
makes corporate governance more effective.1 A basic premise underlying Maug’s argument is that 
concentrated ownership of securities can be reconciled with liquid secondary markets, 
notwithstanding the inherent reduction in liquidity that results from blockholdings and a smaller 
investor base.  
We revisit this premise and provide a new perspective on the ownership-liquidity debate by 
studying an aspect of concentrated ownership that has not received much attention in the literature: 
the risk of a market collapse due to common liquidity shocks, i.e., liquidity shocks that are highly 
correlated across investors, causing a common drop in demand for a security. We argue that this risk 
increases with ownership concentration, especially among homogeneous investors. Our context is 
the market for perpetual floating rate notes (perps). Perps are floating rate notes (FRNs) of infinite 
                         
1 See also, for example, Bolton and von Thadden (1998), Kahn and Winton (1998) and Pritsker (2004). 
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maturity, bearing a coupon indexed to a benchmark rate (usually the London Inter-Bank Offered 
Rate, LIBOR) and re-set at fixed intervals (usually every three or six months).  The first perp was 
issued in 1984. Issuers of perps were largely European, Australian and North American banks and 
institutions with generally very high credit ratings. Perps were traded in well-organized markets by 
sophisticated investors, primarily banks and other institutions.  The market for perps grew rapidly 
and the volume of perps outstanding reached $22 billion by the end of 1986. Perps traded at close to 
par value in the secondary market, which was highly liquid until it began to collapse precipitously in 
December 1986. Secondary market prices experienced drops ranging from 12-25%, and trading 
volume dried up for all perp issues. While the majority of the perps issued during the 1984-1986 
period remain outstanding, the secondary market has not regained its liquidity. 
We document evidence later in the paper that attributes the loss of liquidity in the perp 
market directly to the concentrated institutional ownership of perps. Until December 1986, the 
secondary market remained very liquid despite its narrow investor base.  However, once a common 
drop in demand across perp investors due to highly correlated liquidity shocks caused significant 
losses to market intermediaries and prompted them to withdraw from the market, the secondary 
market was unable to recover its liquidity.  
Our study provides new insights into the phenomenon of market collapse by explicitly 
modeling how correlated liquidity shocks experienced by investors can cause intermediaries to 
withdraw liquidity. Central to our model is a basic Walrasian batch market in which risk-averse 
investors are symmetrically informed and trade only in response to liquidity shocks.  These shocks 
have both an idiosyncratic component and a component that is common across all investors, i.e., a 
  
 
3
systematic component.2 Trading is facilitated by risk-neutral market intermediaries (e.g., dealers or 
exchanges) that contract a bid-ask price spread with investors to recover their costs of offering the 
market. Liquidity shocks that have a large common component, i.e., are highly correlated across 
investors, prevent investors from trading with each other and the resulting drop in trading volume 
causes losses to market makers. Thus, the decision by market making entities to offer the market 
depends on their assessment of common liquidity risk.  Market makers can withdraw and cause 
markets to collapse when the degree of commonality in liquidity shocks exceeds a threshold level.  
Our implications differ from models in which markets break down due to a worsening of information 
asymmetry about asset price fundamentals across market participants. In these models (e.g., Glosten 
and Milgrom, 1985; Bhattacharya and Spiegel, 1991), uninformed investors withdraw from the 
market for fear of being taken advantage of by better-informed market participants, causing a market 
failure.  We achieve a comparable result in our model without asymmetric information.  This 
difference has important ramifications for how a crisis can be resolved.  If the collapse is caused by 
an exacerbation of asymmetric information, it can be resolved by alleviating the information 
asymmetry.  If the collapse is caused by a common liquidity shock, however, prices will rebound 
only if market participants believe that the risk of a recurrence of such shocks is small. Unlike in 
models of rational price bubbles and their collapse (e.g., Kindleberger, 1978; Allen and Gale, 2000) 
our model abstracts from agency problems or imperfect information about asset values. 
Our model is related to the work of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007), who examine the 
links between a security’s market liquidity and traders’ funding liquidity. In their model, the ability 
for traders to provide market liquidity depends on their funding liquidity and the supply of liquidity 
                         
2 Several recent studies have documented common factors in market liquidity, including Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and Pástor and Stambaugh (2003). However, the potential for 
common factors in liquidity shocks experienced by investors to cause market collapse has not been rigorously explored in 
the literature. 
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is reduced when the funding constraints tighten. Kyle and Xiong (2001) and Gromb and Vayanos 
(2002) also develop models where wealth constraints experienced by market participants give rise to 
withdrawal of market liquidity. In contrast, the key driver of market liquidity in our model is the 
demand for liquidity arising from the liquidity shocks experienced by investors. As the correlation 
across individual liquidity shocks increases, the volume of trading declines, thereby negatively 
impacting the viability of the market from the standpoint of the market makers who have invested 
capital to make the market available. They respond by either increasing their spreads to recover 
more revenue (thereby further exacerbating the market illiquidity) or by reducing spreads to 
stimulate trading. If neither of these liquidity supply responses bring in the revenue needed to 
recover their investment, market makers will stop offering the market. 
We find that these alternative explanations do not adequately account for this collapse.  
While our model predicts that the market for perps could recover after a number of periods without 
an additional high commonality state, a unique and puzzling aspect of the perp market is that such a 
recovery did not occur. We attribute this lack of recovery, at least initially, to the unwillingness of 
Japanese banks (which purchased the vast majority of perps) to realize capital losses by selling even 
a part of their holdings at substantially lower prices to help restore market liquidity. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the rise and fall of the 
market for perps. In Section 3, we develop our basic theoretical model, which relates market failure 
to commonality in liquidity shocks. In Section 4, we discuss potential alternate explanations for the 
collapse of the perp market, and provide a brief postscript on attempts to restore liquidity to the 
market. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The rise and fall of the perp market3 
                         
3 The discussion in this section draws heavily on numerous interviews by the authors with market participants. 
  
 
5
 The perp market was launched in April 1984 with an inaugural issue by NatWest (Citibank 
issued a “quasi-perp” in 1980), and perps were quickly hailed as a successful financial innovation. In 
this section, we examine the rise and fall of the perp market, and link its initial success to the growth 
of investor confidence about the liquidity of the secondary market for perps, and its collapse to a 
common liquidity shock that substantially increased expectations of the reoccurrence of a common 
liquidity shock and led market makers to abandon the market permanently. 
2.1 The rise 
Floating Rate Notes (FRNs), both dated and perpetual, have particular investor appeal due to 
stability of principal value when interest rates are expected to be volatile. Issuance of perps was 
especially attractive to banks that were experiencing pressures to increase their regulatory capital 
during the mid-eighties and saw perps as being well suited for this purpose because interest 
payments on perps, unlike dividends on preferred stock, were tax-deductible (IFR, 1987).  Indeed, 
all issues of perps include a provision that allows the borrower to automatically call the perp if the 
tax authorities disallow the deductibility as a business expense. U.S. issuers did not venture into the 
market until just before it collapsed, having initially held back due to a presumption that the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) would construe the interest paid on perps as the equivalent of dividends and 
therefore not tax-deductible.  
Banks sought permission to count issuance of perps as capital for regulatory purposes. The 
Bank of England, Britain’s central bank, did not permit the first issue of perps by NatWest to qualify 
as regulatory capital.  But, in rejecting this request, the Bank of England set conditions under which 
a perp could be counted as regulatory capital. The critical requirement stipulated by the Bank of 
England was that perps must be automatically converted into preferred stock in the event of default.  
 Following the Bank of England, several other central banks—including those in Australia, Canada, 
France and the United States —established conditions under which perps could be counted as capital 
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for regulatory purposes, making the issuance of perps a feasible solution to the need to increase 
regulatory capital. The Japanese authorities were about to authorize the use of perps to meet capital 
requirements when the market began to collapse in December 1986.  
The challenge in marketing perps was to convince prospective investors that perps were close 
substitutes for fixed-maturity, floating-rate notes and money market instruments.  Underwriters 
argued that the floating-rate feature made the interest-rate risk on perps equivalent to that on any 
other floating rate instrument.  Moreover, they addressed concerns about the infinite maturity of 
perps by arguing that they could be sold any time at a price close to par in a broad, deep secondary 
market. Investor confidence in the liquidity of the secondary market was thus key to pricing perps in 
line with money market and other finite-maturity, floating-rate instruments of comparable quality. 
The initial rapid growth of issues and the decline of spreads suggest that underwriters were 
increasingly successful in this regard. 
Banks, especially Japanese banks, were eager to invest in floating-rate, dollar-denominated 
instruments during the eighties and became the main buyers of perps.  Market observers estimate that 
as much as 80% of the perps outstanding were placed with Japanese financial institutions. Overall, 
banks held an estimated 90% of outstanding perps (IFR, December 6, 1986, p. 3633). They found 
perps an attractive way to increase returns over interbank placements (which yielded LIBOR or less) 
at what appeared to be little additional risk. 
From 1984 to the end of 1986 the spread over LIBOR that perps were priced at steadily 
declined to around 10-15 basis points, indicating that prices increased as investors gained confidence 
in the liquidity of the secondary market. The spread relative to the LIBOR benchmark seemed 
sufficiently attractive to induce some governments, such as those of Belgium, Denmark and Sweden, 
to issue perps, although they had no tax or regulatory incentive to do so.   The volume of perps 
outstanding stood at $3.5 billion by the end of 1984, $16 billion by the end of 1985, and $22 billion 
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by the end of 1986, accounting for 29% and 46%, respectively, of total FRN issuance in the latter 
two years (Meerschwam, 1987). Through 1986, nearly 60 perps were issued.  
The perp market was a dealer market, which maximized the potential for liquidity relative to 
other market structures. The market’s liquidity increased steadily as evidenced by transactions costs 
and the size of the standard lot for which dealers would quote a price.  By November 1986, more 
than fifty dealers stood ready to quote two-way prices for standard lots of $5 million at a 10 basis 
point spread (Williams and Hole, 1987).  Although volume data for individual issues is not 
available, an indirect indication of volume can be inferred from the number of perp issues in the 
Euroclear listing of the twenty most actively traded money market issues each month.  Perps were 
among the most actively traded money market instruments through the first quarter in 1987, with 
average aggregate daily volumes of as much as $1 billion recorded by Euroclear during this period. 
2.2 The collapse  
The success of the perp market was short-lived. The proximate cause of the market collapse 
appears to have been a rumor of an international agreement on bank capital requirements that would 
require banks to deduct holdings of perps (and other capital securities) issued by other banks in 
computing their capital for regulatory purposes. The Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and 
Supervisory Practices (Basel Committee) was expected to take the view that the banking system 
would be more resilient, and the danger of contagion would be less, if nonbanks held capital claims 
on banks. The basis for this rumor was the proposed Anglo-American Accord on the assessment of 
capital adequacy.  The proposed regulations were officially released in the United States on January 
8, 1987, but major banks were well aware of the general outlines of the approach.  The part of the 
proposal that was of particular relevance to the market for perps was the decision regarding bank 
holdings of other banks’ capital instruments.  The official release (Comptroller of the Currency, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Federal Reserve Board, 1987, p.7) noted that the Bank of 
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England already deducts such holdings from capital: “...except for limited concessions to allow some 
banks to play an active role in market-making in the primary (new issues) and/or secondary markets. 
 This policy will be maintained.  The U.S. authorities accept the principle underlying this policy and 
will monitor bank holdings of capital instruments issued by other banks and may, as appropriate, 
deduct these items on a case-by-case basis.”  
Although the proposed regulations pertained only to British and American banks, the 
potential implications for banks in Japan were clear (Wagster, 1996).  As one market participant 
observed, “The Ministry of Finance in Tokyo must eventually insist on similar provisioning, 
particularly if Japanese banks are allowed to offer perpetual debt themselves.  That will just about 
kill off the market,” (IFR, December 6, 1986, p. 3633). Since the majority of perps were issued by 
banks, even the possibility of this kind of change in regulations provided a powerful incentive for 
banks holding perps to sell. 
On Wednesday, December 3, 1986, sell orders overwhelmed almost all of the core fifty 
dealers in the perp market and they suspended normal trading (Financial Times, Dec. 4, 1986, p.38). 
 The feared regulatory change caused banks (that held most of the outstanding perps) to attempt to 
sell at the same time, producing a one-way market. In our model, we characterize this as a common 
liquidity shock that affected most holders of perps in the same way at the same time.  Although 
secondary market trading enables individuals to mitigate idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, the market 
mechanism breaks down when the shocks are expected to apply simultaneously in the same direction 
for all investors, and that is precisely what happened to the secondary market for perps. 
As participants noted in the financial press at the time of the market collapse, “We have seen 
the door slammed shut on the only way in which investors can really leave this market—trading 
liquidity.... The whole psychology of this market has now changed—it’s never going to be the same 
again,” (IFR, December 6, 1986, p. 3632).  Along the same lines, another market participant (IFR, 
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January 10, 1987, p. 3) concluded, “The crisis is basically one of confidence, and perpetuals are 
undergoing a general re-evaluation of worth separate from any underlying change in the quality and 
credit of the debt involved and external influences such as interest rates.” 
Ironically, the rumor proved to be false, although market participants could not confirm this 
until the Basel Committee issued a Consultative Paper a year later, officially rejecting this 
unfavorable treatment of perps and other bank capital issues. The Committee’s Consultative Paper of 
December 1987 (p.9) stated:  “The Committee carefully considered the possibility of requiring 
deduction of banks’ holdings of capital issued by other banks.... Several G-10 supervisory 
authorities currently require such a deduction to be made in order to discourage the banking system 
as a whole from creating cross-holdings of capital, rather than drawing capital from outside 
investors.  The Committee is very conscious that such double-gearing (or “double-leveraging”) can 
have systemic dangers for the banking system by making it more vulnerable to the rapid 
transmission of problems from one institution to another... Despite these concerns, however, the 
Committee as a whole is not presently in favor of a general policy of deducting all holdings of other 
banks’ capital, on the grounds that to do so could impede certain significant and desirable changes 
taking place in the structure of domestic banking systems.”   
By then, however, the damage to investor confidence in market liquidity was irreparable. 
From Wednesday, December 3, 1986, the secondary market began to collapse.  Market makers 
withdrew from the market in anticipation of continuing losses. Typical dealer-to-dealer price spreads 
increased from 10 basis points to 50 basis points while at the same time standard lot sizes declined 
from $5 million to $1 million (Williams and Hole, 1987). The number of active market makers 
plummeted from 50 to fewer than 10 by March 1987, and these functioned mainly as brokers—
trying to match buyers with sellers—rather than standing ready to buy or sell at a stated spread.  
After December 1986, only perps issued by the British clearing banks made the list of the twenty 
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most active issues maintained by Euroclear. By May 1987, perps had dropped from the list 
altogether. In the absence of a liquid secondary market, the new issue market completely 
disappeared. 
Secondary market prices fell sharply during this period. Figure 1 plots the value from 
November 1984 through August 1988 of a price index of eleven perps issued by British clearing 
banks. The sudden collapse and lack of recovery of the secondary market is clearly evident.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The events of December 1986 had exposed the narrow investor base of the secondary market 
for perps. The episode made clear that the liquidity of the perp secondary market depended critically 
on confidence in the breadth of the market -- on the belief that other investors would not change 
their portfolio preferences in the same way at the same time. When a liquidity shock affected all the 
bank holders of perps, the negative implications of the overwhelming concentration of perps in the 
hands of Japanese banks for the prospect of additional systemic liquidity shocks became all too 
evident. The absence of any evidence of contagion, i.e., the perp collapse spreading to other 
securities markets or being caused by events in other markets, lends support to our view that the perp 
collapse was rooted in the narrow perp investor base. 
In the next section, we formalize the above arguments and develop our simple theoretical 
model to explain how common liquidity risk can give rise to market collapse despite symmetrically 
informed market participants and lack of uncertainty about future cash flows. While the model is 
motivated and illustrated by the perp collapse, we argue that it is applicable in any market setting 
characterized by a significant level of common liquidity risk. 
3.  The Model 
In this section, we present our model and relate liquidity to asset prices by considering a 
model where investors receive imperfectly correlated liquidity shocks and then rebalance their 
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holdings by trading in an asset market.  We assume that trading occurs in a Walrasian batch market 
in which all trades clear at the same price subject to a bid-ask spread. Trading is facilitated by M 
identical, competing, risk-neutral market intermediaries (exchanges or dealers), each of whom incurs 
a fixed cost of c in setting up the market for each round of trade.4  This cost may be viewed as the 
opportunity cost of providing immediacy and is recovered by way of the spread. We first consider 
the basic case with one round of trading and then examine a more general setting with multiple 
rounds of trading to determine how liquid markets can become illiquid. 
3.1 The basic case 
There is a risky asset which is traded at period 1 and pays off θ ε+  in period 2, where θ is 
non-random at date 1 and ε  is normally distributed with mean zero and variance vε . Thus, investors 
and intermediaries have knowledge of the θ  component but not of the ε  component. We assume 
that there are N outside investors, each with an endowment iw .  All endowments are normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance wv , and a common correlation ρ . Therefore these 
stochastic endowments may be viewed as liquidity shocks which force investors to attempt to 
rebalance their holdings of the risky asset in the secondary market.5 The random variables iw  are 
independent of θ  and ε . All investors have exponential utility with a risk aversion coefficient R. In 
addition, a linear technology is used to set the spread, so that the spread on an order of size x  is xλ , 
with each side paying 0.5 xλ .6  
                         
4 Multiple market intermediaries are not necessary for our basic result; it holds even where a single intermediary makes 
an entry decision. 
5 See, for example, Glosten (1989), Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991) and Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) for a similar 
formulation of liquidity shocks. Common shocks to endowments can be caused by a variety of systemic events such as 
tax and regulatory changes. 
6 We have adopted this particular formulation of transactions costs purely for tractability, without loss of generality of 
our key results. See, for example, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Fernando (2003). 
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A key parameter of focus in our analysis is the endowment correlation, ρ, which proxies in 
our model for the degree to which investors are exposed to common liquidity shocks.  As noted in 
Section 1, we suggest that the market’s exposure to common liquidity risk is higher when the 
security is marketed to a small group of institutional investors rather than a large group of diffuse 
individual investors. From an empirical standpoint, this can happen because institutional investors 
engage in characteristic herding (Sias, 2004). Also, some institutions, such as banks and insurance 
companies, may be more susceptible to common macroeconomic factors including changes in taxes 
and regulations. Finally, institutional investors act as financial intermediaries by pooling individuals’ 
liquidity needs (Edelen, 1999), which leads to greater commonality in liquidity shocks.  
Denote each investor's desired trade as ix . Using the mean-variance analysis implied by 
exponential utility, each investor maximizes ( ) 0.5 var( )i iE K R K− , where 
( )( ) ( 0.5 )i i i i iK x w x P xθ ε λ= + + − +  denotes the investor’s end-of-period wealth and P is the 
market-clearing price at period 1. The objective function reduces to 
2 2( ) 0.5 0.5 ( )i i i i ix P w x Rv x wεθ θ λ− + − − + , so that the demand of each outside investor at period 1, 
denoted by ix  is 
 ii
P Rw vx
Rv
ε
ε
θ
λ
− −= + . (1) 
 Let 
1
N
ii
X w=≡ ∑ . Imposing the market clearing condition that 1 0N ii x= =∑ , we have 
 RvP X
N
εθ= −  (2) 
Substituting from P into (1), we have  
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 i i
Rv Xx w
Rv N
ε
ε λ
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠  (3) 
The total expected revenue of the exchanges (or dealers) offering a market in the security 
is ( )210.5 N iiE xλ =Γ = ∑ . We know that  
 
2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2( )i i i
R v X Xx w w
Rv N N
ε
ε λ
⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠
 (4) 
Let var( )Xv X≡ . Then, the total expected revenue becomes  
 
2 2
2 2
0.5 2 cov( , )
( )
X
w i
R v v v X w
Rv N N
ε
ε
λ
λ
⎛ ⎞Γ = + −⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠  (5) 
Now, it is easy to see that ( 1)X w wv N v N N vρ= + − , while cov( , ) ( 1)i w wX w v N vρ= + − . Thus 
 
2 2
2
0.5 1(1 ) 1
( ) w
R v v
Rv N
ε
ε
λ ρλ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞Γ = − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  (6) 
It is worth noting that total expected revenue 0Γ =  when liquidity shocks are perfectly correlated 
( 1ρ = ). In this case, there will be no change in relative investor endowments and therefore, 
investors will not trade. Similarly, in the case where trading costs are prohibitively high (λ →∞ ) 
trading volume will converge to zero, causing a corresponding drop to zero in total expected 
revenue.   
Since there are M perfectly-competitive market intermediaries in equilibrium and each 
intermediary incurs a cost of  c to set up trading in the security, then the equilibrium λ  must be such 
that the zero expected profit condition holds, i.e., McΓ = , or that 
 
2 2
2
0.5 1(1 ) 1
( ) w
R v v Mc
Rv N
ε
ε
λ ρλ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− − =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  (7) 
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In order for a real root to exist for λ  in the above quadratic equation, the discriminant must satisfy 
the non-negativity condition given by 
 1(1 ) 1 8wRv v McNε
ρ ⎛ ⎞− − ≥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . (8) 
A market will be offered when (8) is fulfilled. Proposition 1 summarizes our key results pertaining to 
the likelihood that market intermediaries will offer a market. 
Proposition 1. A market is more likely to be offered (a) the lower the cost of setting up the market; 
(b) the lower the number of market intermediaries; (c) the lower the correlation of liquidity shocks; 
(d) the higher the number of investors; (e) the higher the risk aversion coefficient; (f) the higher the 
volatility of liquidity shocks; and (g) the higher the riskiness of the security.  In the scenario that is 
the reverse of the above features, the market collapses (fails to exist).   
It is worth noting, in particular, that the market collapse threshold is lowered as investor 
concentration increases, as measured through both the number of investors in the market, “(d)” and 
through the extent to which their liquidity shocks are correlated, “(c).” For a given level of 
correlation, trading volume and the amount of revenue generated by market makers decline with the 
number of investors, making it more likely that revenues will fall short of the level required to 
recover the cost of opening the market. This finding supports our argument that the market’s 
exposure to common liquidity risk, and therefore its vulnerability to a collapse, is higher when the 
securities are concentrated in the hands of a small group of homogeneous large investors rather than 
a large group of diffuse small investors. Additionally, for a given number of investors, trading 
volume and market maker revenue decline as the correlation of liquidity shocks increases, once 
again increasing the likelihood of a market closure. 
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The result in “(b),” that reducing the number of market intermediaries makes it more likely 
that a market will exist, parallels the finding in Glosten (1989). However, in Glosten’s model the 
result is driven by a reduction in the ability of market makers to withstand losses to informed traders 
when competition reduces their profits. In contrast, our finding shows that this prediction holds even 
in the absence of asymmetric information. In our setting, an increase in the number of intermediaries 
reduces their collective ability to withstand a common liquidity shock.  
 Another interesting aspect of the analysis relates to how the equilibrium spread varies with 
the endowment correlation.  It turns out that this relation is nonmonotonic.  One can see from (7) 
that if one transfers the term involving ρ to the right-hand side, what remains on the left-hand side is 
nonmonotonic in lambda.  So if ρ increases, the right-hand side increases, but a higher or lower λ 
may work to increase the left-hand side in order to restore the equality.  The intuition is that if the 
endowment correlation is high the market wishes to charge a higher spread, but this also has an 
indirect effect of lowering each investor's trade.  In equilibrium, the net effect on the spread balances 
these effects.  If the risk aversion coefficient of investors is sufficiently high, however, the first 
effect dominates and the increase in the endowment spread increases the equilibrium spread.7  Our 
analysis indicates how equilibrium liquidity depends on the degree of commonality in the liquidity 
shocks across investors, a parameter that is distinct from quantities related to the degree of 
asymmetric information (as in Glosten, 1989, or Bhattacharya and Spiegel, 1991). 
 We now show that price drops can occur as investors update their priors about the likelihood 
of high and low realizations of the endowment correlation.  To do this, we calculate the ex ante 
expected utility of each investor prior to date 1.  We assume that θ is ex ante normally distributed 
with mean zero and variance vθ, and independent of all other random variables.  We begin by stating 
                         
7 It can be seen from using the implicit function theorem on (7) that the effect of ρ on λ is positive if and only if R vε > λ. 
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the following lemma, which is a standard result on multivariate normal random variables (see, for 
example, Brown and Jennings, 1989). 
Lemma 1. Let ( )Q χ  be a quadratic function of the random vector : ( ) ' 'Q C B Aχ χ χ χ χ= + − , 
where ( )~ ,Nχ μ Σ , and A is a square, symmetric matrix whose dimension corresponds to that of 
χ . We then have 
 
[ ] [ ]
( ) ( )
1/ 2
11
exp( ( ))  2
exp ' ' (1/ 2)( '- 2 ' ')(2 2 .
E Q Det A I
C B µ µ Aµ B µ A A B Aµ
χ −
−−
= Σ + ×
+ + + +Σ −
 (9) 
As noted previously, in our case, the wealth of investor i, denoted by Ki, is given by 
( )( ) ( 0.5 )i i i i iK x w x P xθ ε λ= + + − +  where ix  is given by (1) and P by (2).  In turn, λ  solves (7).  
Since all random variables have a mean of zero, and there are no terms linear in the random 
variables, the ex ante expected utility, [ ]exp( iE RK− −  is given by [ ] 1/ 22Det A I −− Σ + , where Σ  is 
the variance covariance matrix of [ ], , ,iX w ε θ , and A is –R times the quadratic form implied by the 
expression for Ki.  The matrix corresponding to this quadratic form is  
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 (10) 
Given that the wealth from not trading is given simply by ( ) iwθ ε+ , it can easily be shown that the 
expected utility from not being able to trade is given by the simple expression 
  1/ 22
1
1 ( )wDet R v v vε θ
− ⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦
 (11) 
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We denote the two expected utilities (from being able to trade and not being able to trade) as tEU  
and ntEU , respectively.   Consider the following scenario.  Suppose that the endowments are realized 
(and, possibly, the market opens) at time 1.  At time –1, the prior distribution of the endowment 
correlation is lρ  with probability 1-π and h lρ ρ>  with probabilityπ .  Also, suppose that hρ  is a 
correlation level that causes the market to shut down (i.e., violates (8)).  Then, the certainty 
equivalent at date –1 (also the shadow price of the security) is given by 
( ) [ ]1/ ln (1 ) t ntR EU EUπ π− + , where tEU  is evaluated at ρ= lρ . At date 0, the true endowment 
correlation is realized.  In general, if it turns out to be the low value, the shadow price will rise, and 
if it turns out to be the high value, the shadow price will fall.   If lρ  is realized, the new certainty 
equivalent (CE) is simply [ ] 1/ 21/ tR Det EU −− , whereas if hρ  is realized, the corresponding CE is 
[ ] 1/ 21/ ntR Det EU −− .  
As a numerical illustration, consider the following parameter values: M = 1, c = 0.01, R = 
0.2, N = 100; hρ  = 0.9, lρ  = 0.1; all other parameters are set to unity.  For hρ ρ= , no trade takes 
place.  For lρ ρ= , trade does take place, and, from (7),  there are two values of λ  that are 
consistent with equilibrium, 0.029, and 1.35.  Picking the higher value, 1.35, implies that the 
difference in certainty equivalents (i.e., the change in the shadow price of the security) across dates –
1 and 0  is +3.10 when ρ is revealed to be the lower value, 0.1, and –4.06 when it is revealed to be 
the higher value of 0.9.  Thus, the shadow price of the security drops (rises) as market participants 
discover that the commonality in liquidity shocks is high (low).  This illustration demonstrates how 
sharp price decreases can occur as the beliefs of market participants about the possibility of not 
being able to trade shift over time. 
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3.2 Learning about liquidity 
The above analysis proceeded on the assumption that market participants had perfect 
foresight about market liquidity and rationally incorporated their beliefs in asset prices. Furthermore, 
the decision by market makers to open or close the secondary market was assumed to be exogenous 
to the model. Next, we focus on the question of how market makers form beliefs about future market 
liquidity, and how this process can lead to an endogenous shift from a liquid to an illiquid market. 
Since the decision to open or close a market in our setting rests exclusively with market makers, we 
assume for simplicity that new generations of traders enter the market in each period while market 
makers span multiple periods.   
Each round of trade is followed by a period where the security pays off a random liquidation 
amount to investors, and after this payout, a new round of trade with a new generation of outside 
investors starts afresh.  We label each pair of trading and liquidation rounds as belonging to time n.  
The structure of security payoffs and endowments is the same as in the previous section, and each 
random variable at time n is provided a subscript of n.   The variables θn, εn, and win, are mutally 
independent.  Furthermore, these variables have common variances of vθ, vε, and vw, respectively, 
for all n. 
In our model, market makers deduce the degree of liquidity of the market by observing 
realizations of correlations in past periods. As before, assume that the endowment correlation is 
either lρ  (low commonality state) or hρ  (high commonality state).  Each period’s realization of the 
endowment correlation is revealed following the liquidation payoff.   We also assume that the 
decision to offer the market is made prior to the realization of the true endowment correlation.   
As we demonstrate, when the true probability of a high commonality state is low, a continued 
sequence of experiences with low commonality states can cause market makers to underestimate the 
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probability of a high commonality state.  In our model, market makers update their beliefs in 
Bayesian fashion, so that their subjective probability of a high commonality state progressively 
diminishes as the sequence of periods without a high commonality state continues. This can cause 
security prices to deviate from the level that reflects the true probability of a high commonality state. 
A reevaluation occurs only when market participants experience a liquidity shock that turns out to 
have high commonality. 
Market makers offer markets based on their subjective (uniform across all market makers) 
probability estimate of the occurrence of the high commonality state. Under perfect competition, the 
zero expected profit condition underlying (7) and (8) above must now hold in each individual period 
that they decide to offer a market. At the outset, we assume that the subjective probability estimate 
of the high commonality state is low enough for market makers to open the market. The indicator tχ  
= 1 if the high commonality state occurs and 0 otherwise.     
Market makers form a subjective probability estimate of the occurrence of the high 
commonality state by observing a sequence of prior market states. As before denote the probability 
of the high commonality state as π, which corresponds to the proportion of states in the sequence 
that turns out to have high commonality.  The prior probability density function of π is assumed to 
be a beta distribution with parameters α > 0 and β > 0:8 
11( )( , ) (1 ) ,    0 1
( ) ( )
 f  =  βαα βπ α β π ππα β
−−Γ + − ≤ ≤Γ Γ               (12) 
whose unconditional mean is E(π) =α /( α + β ), where α and β are chosen appropriately based on the 
available prior information about π. Lemma 2 provides the result for the corresponding posterior 
probability distribution (see, for example, DeGroot (1970)). 
                         
8 The beta distribution is widely used to represent distributions of variables that naturally lie between 0 and 1, such 
as proportions and probability estimates. See DeGroot (1970) and Guttentag and Herring (1984). 
  
 
20
Lemma 2. The posterior probability distribution after observing a sequence of n + 1 states is also a 
beta distribution with parameters y+=′ αα ; and yn −+=′ ββ : 
' 1 ' 1
1 1
( )( ,..., ) (1 )
( ) ( )t n t
g  |   α βα βπ χ χ π πα β
− −
− − −
′ ′Γ += −′ ′Γ Γ       (13) 
 
where y is the total number of high commonality states observed in this sequence. 
We will assume that a new sequence of observations begins if the immediately preceding 
event is a high commonality state. Proposition 2 specifies how market participants form their 
subjective probability beliefs about future market liquidity by observing past liquidity. 
Proposition 2. Market makers form their subjective probability beliefs as follows: 
1. If the preceding n + 1 events are low commonality states, the subjective probability 
assessment after observing n + 1 low commonality states will be: 
1
1
0
t
t
t n
E    
nτ
απ χ α β
−
= − −
⎡ ⎤= =⎢ ⎥ + +⎣ ⎦∑ .               (14) 
As n increases, the subjective probability of a high commonality state goes to zero. 
2. If the immediately preceding event is a high commonality state, the subjective probability 
assessment will be: 
βα
αχπ +
+==− 1)1( 1    E t .                     (15) 
Note that: 
1  
+ n  + +
α α α
α β α β α β
+< <+                        (16) 
The occurrence of a high commonality state (HCS) will cause market participants to overestimate 
initially the probability that such a state will reoccur.  But, if the market reopens, as the number of 
periods without an additional HCS increases, the subjective probability of a HCS will decline, 
ultimately falling below the unconditional probability. This shift in subjective probability of a high 
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commonality state is the critical determinant of whether market makers will open the secondary 
market.  For convenience, in the ensuing discussion, we will denote as Ec(π) the conditional 
expectation of π after any sequence of observations of low or high commonality states. 
It is straightforward to modify (8) to define a threshold level, ξ, of the subjective expected 
probability of a high commonality state above which dealers will not be willing to make a secondary 
market. Indeed, by the law of iterated expectations, observing that E(ρ)=ξ ρh+[1- ξ] ρl  at the 
threshold expectation of π, and substituting for the expected value of ρ in place of ρ in (8), we find 
that ξ =(ρh-ρl)-1[1-ρl -8McN/{(N-1)Rvεvw}]. 
Whether the secondary market is reopened after a HCS depends on the unconditional 
expected probability E(π) = α /( α + β ) of this state . Note that after the first occurrence of a HCS, 
the conditional expected probability of a HCS, Ec(π), rises above E(π).  If E(π) is sufficiently high, 
Ec(π) may rise above the threshold level ξ. As a result, market makers will not reopen the secondary 
market. In contrast, when E(π) is low, even though Ec(π) may rise above E(π), it may not rise above 
ξ and therefore, market makers may reopen the secondary market. Our theoretical framework thus 
shows how investor confidence in the liquidity of a market can collapse in the event of a high 
commonality state, leading to either transitory or permanent illiquidity in the secondary market 
depending on how the expectations of market participants are changed by the occurrence of the 
HCS. 
Our model describes how common liquidity risk can cause a market collapse despite lack of 
any information asymmetry across market participants or a significant deviation of asset prices from 
their fundamental value.  This happens, for example, when ownership by a relatively narrow group 
of large investors leads to a high degree of commonality in liquidity shocks. While we argue that the 
model is consistent with the perp collapse and has relevance for other markets where narrow 
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ownership or other factors increase systemic liquidity risk, it is nonetheless useful to consider 
whether other explanations are applicable as well. We turn to this question in the next section, 
drawing from the available evidence on the performance of the perp market especially following the 
collapse. 
4.  Alternative Explanations and a Postscript on the Perp Market 
 In this section we consider some plausible alternative hypotheses for the collapse of the perp 
market and discuss the lack of recovery in market liquidity. We begin by considering the possibility 
that the collapse of the market for perps was driven by a credit shock rather than a liquidity shock. 
For example, did the rumored tightening of capital adequacy requirements cause investors to fear 
that more banks would have trouble meeting minimum capital standards and thus default on their 
perps?  We have found no evidence of any price movements in other outstanding securities by perp 
issuers that would be consistent with such a hypothesis. Overall, the high credit quality of perps 
makes the credit decline hypothesis less plausible and we have not detected any change in credit 
quality either immediately preceding or following the market collapse. 
 The refutation of the rumor notwithstanding, it is possible that the market may have factored 
in a higher probability of future adverse regulation. However, there has been no such development in 
the 20 years following the collapse.  Ultimately, even if there was a reason for investors to factor in a 
lower credit quality, this should not have precluded them from trading. This is not what has 
happened. Although 47 perps remain outstanding, the loss of liquidity appears to be permanent. 
 Another possibility is that perps may have been overpriced relative to their fundamental 
value prior to the collapse, especially since from a theoretical standpoint it is possible that perps 
were more susceptible to mispricing than securities that have a finite maturity. Since all the perps 
were issued at par in the primary market and continued to trade at par in the secondary market, such 
mispricing, if any, had to have persisted from the outset.  
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 Perps were priced in the primary market relative to dated FRNs, initially at annual spreads of 
20-25 basis points, but since both securities had the same duration (3 to 6 months depending on the 
coupon reset interval) and the same initial liquidity, the price differential presumably compensated 
investors for the higher holding period credit risk of perps. After the collapse, the annual yield 
differential increased by approximately an order of magnitude to around 200-250 basis points. A 
spread of this magnitude seems unrealistic for dated and perpetual securities of comparable credit 
quality. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that primary issuance of perps came to a halt 
following the collapse. Moreover, even if this higher spread was deemed reasonable by investors, we 
would have expected to see the market remain liquid at the lower prices. As noted previously, this 
did not happen. It seems more plausible that the higher yield spread following the collapse was 
compensation for the lack of liquidity in the market, as predicted by our model. 
 It is also possible that there was information asymmetry pertaining to perp fundamentals 
across different market participants, giving rise to the collapse. However, in the case of perps, there 
has been no significant information arriving in the market in the 20 years following the collapse 
(either pertaining directly to perp cash flows, or indirectly about regulation of the perp market) 
which would suggest that some perp market participants had information that others did not have 
prior to the collapse. Additionally, the theories of market collapse based on information asymmetry 
would predict a revival of liquidity when all the information privately held by investors is eventually 
reflected in prices. This has not happened in the perp market. 
 Finally, it is possible that the perp collapse was triggered by the removal of a clientele effect 
(making perps more attractive to bank investors) or an implicit regulatory subsidy (resulting from 
banks being permitted to hold reciprocal capital obligations).While banks were the dominant 
investors in this market, however, any potential regulatory subsidies (for example, the benefit of 
increasing regulatory capital by issuing perps) accrue only to bank issuers, not bank investors. We 
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have not found any evidence of a benefit from holding perps that accrues exclusively to bank 
investors. Moreover, Japanese banks, which accounted for most of the holdings of perps, did not 
issue perps in this era and so they were not beneficiaries of an implicit regulatory subsidy. 
Although most of the perps issued during the 1984-86 period remain outstanding, the market 
has not recovered its liquidity. Several attempts have been made to restore liquidity to perps (and 
arbitrage the price spread between perps and dated FRNs) by repackaging the promised cash flows 
as instruments with fixed maturities (Meerschwam, 1987). The basic idea was to add a high quality 
zero-coupon bond (an instrument that was all principal repayment with no interest payments) to the 
perp (an instrument with only interest payments and no principal repayment) to create a synthetic, 
dated FRN that would appeal to a broader range of investors.  These efforts have met with limited 
success, ironically for the same reason that keeps the market illiquid in the first place: the 
unwillingness of Japanese banks to recognize a loss by exchanging their perps at below par value 
due to Japanese regulatory authorities permitting them to defer recognition of capital losses until the 
perps were sold. Market makers and other potential market participants believed that any rise in the 
prices of perps would be swiftly met by sales of perps by Japanese banks and so they were unwilling 
to buy.  But, so long as perps traded below par, Japanese banks, which were under international 
pressure to increase regulatory capital, were not eager to sell below par and realize a capital loss, 
particularly since the stream of cash flows from perps was never in doubt. 
The collapse of the secondary market for perps caused a sharp decline in prices of 12% to 
25% due to the collapse of the marketability premium. Although indicative prices continue to be 
reported for most outstanding issues of perps, they reflect sporadic transactions that are negotiated 
between the buyer and seller and not prices at which dealers are prepared to trade.  As such, they are 
consistent with the discount applied to assets in other illiquid markets (see, for example, Silber, 
1991). 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
The perp episode emphasizes the importance of a broad investor base in establishing and 
maintaining liquid secondary markets.  While the perp market initially became very liquid despite its 
narrow investor base consisting principally of Japanese banks, its liquidity permanently vanished 
once a common liquidity shock caused market intermediaries to negatively reassess the risk of 
keeping the market open.  
 Our study provides new insights into why markets collapse. As we have shown, markets can 
collapse even in the absence of the two conditions that are thought in the literature to give rise to a 
collapse: the bursting of a bubble concerning fundamental value or information asymmetry about the 
value of the fundamental determinants of asset prices. Our theoretical framework and the perp 
episode demonstrate that market collapse can be an endogenous phenomenon, independent of the 
fundamental value of assets, but critically dependent on the commonality in the liquidity needs of 
the investor clientele that holds the assets. 
 Our analysis has important implications that apply to the ownership-liquidity tradeoff.  
Specifically, we suggest that to avoid market failures of the type that occurred in the perp market, 
security offerings need to be marketed to a broad diverse investor base, which would not only lower 
the cost of capital by increasing liquidity, but also prevent market collapse and closure of a future 
source of financing. This benefit of broad-based ownership has not been previously emphasized in 
the literature, and counters the traditional reason for concentrated ownership: that the latter leads to 
more effective corporate governance. 
 While the perp episode provides an ideal experimental setting to analyze the effect of 
liquidity shocks without the complications of asymmetric information, it may also seem like an 
isolated incident. We would argue otherwise. Ju, Linn and Zhu (2007) document that the U.S. 
natural gas market suffered diminished liquidity for about a month when its largest intermediary 
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Enron collapsed. This episode is comparable to the perp collapse in the sense that the fundamentals 
of the natural gas market were not in question at any time. Volcker (1986) documents an episode 
where the U.S. Treasury market underwent a near-collapse in November 1985 when a software 
glitch created a liquidity problem at a major intermediary in government securities, the Bank of New 
York. A serious crisis was averted only by the Federal Reserve providing an overdraft of $30 billion 
to BNY, which was more than 30 times BNY’s primary capital. 
One potential limitation of our model is that it does not allow for the possibility of shocks to 
fundamentals or for asymmetric information across market participants with regard to fundamentals. 
While as in the perp case the trigger for a collapse need not arise from asset fundamentals, a view 
that is supported by the growing empirical evidence of commonality in liquidity, incorporating these 
elements will provide a richer set of empirical implications and help to strengthen our understanding 
of the interactions between shocks to asset fundamentals and shocks to investor and market liquidity.
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Figure 1: Behavior of perp price index. This figure plots the value from November 1984 through June 1991 of a price index of 
eleven perps issued by British Clearing Banks. The sudden collapse and lack of recovery of the secondary market is clearly evident. 
However, prices after the collapse are updated infrequently based on the last reported transaction, and may not be current. Data 
source: Datastream. 
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